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labor practice under the LMRA, since no remedy in damages
is granted under the federal statute." In Weber v. AnheuserBusch 12 the Supreme Court went a step further and held that a
state may not prohibit the exercise of rights which may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection of the federal act.
This decision came in logical sequence to the Garner case, for,
although the Garner case arose where a state enjoined activity
which was also prohibited by the federal act, there was language
in the opinion to indicate that picketing not restrained by the
act should be free from restraint. 18
In light of the Anheuser-Busch case, the instant decision
seems to be correct. The fact that the union was found not
guilty on the merits of the specific unfair labor practice complained of was not enough to vest jurisdiction in the state court.
The court declined to state whether or not the picketing was
within the prohibition or protection of other sections of the federal act, recognizing primary jurisdiction in the NLRB to determine these questions. The court found, however, that the conduct "may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection
afforded by the act."'14 This being so, the jurisdiction of the
state court was preempted by that of the NLRB under the
Anheuser-Busch test.
Both the Garnerand Anheuser-Busch cases indicate that the
Supreme Court intends to retain its policy of allowing a state
court to enjoin picketing where there is violence involved. 15
State court injunctions in other cases should not issue where
the activity is prohibited or may reasonably be deemed to be
protected under the federal act.
William J.Doran,Jr.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT - TORTS - IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPALITY
FROM LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiff sued defendant city for the wrongful death of her
eight-year old son who drowned in a municipal swimming pool.
11. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656

(1954).
12. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
13. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953).
14. Mississippi Valley Electric Co. v. General Truck Drivers, 229 La. 37, 85
So.2d 22, 27 (1955).
15. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 477 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
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The district court directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held, affirmed. In the maintenance of a swimming pool a municipal corporation is engaged
in a governmental function and is not susceptible to liability
for negligence. The fact that a small admission charge is made
to defray the maintenance expense does not make the function
a proprietary one so as to subject the municipality to liability.
Nissen v. Redelack, 74 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 1955).

The doctrine that a municipal corporation is not liable for
the negligence of its employees is an American interpretation of

the old English maxim that "the king can do no wrong."1 It is
based on the notion that public funds should not be used to
compensate the injury of an individual:2 Recognizing the injustice which sometimes results from following the doctrine,
the courts have sought to circumvent its application by adopting
a legal fiction whereby negligent acts of municipal employees
are classified into those resulting from "governmental" operations, for which there can be no liability, and those resulting
from "corporate" or "proprietary" operations, for which there
may be liability.3 The tests to determine the classification of
the operation vary, 4 but whenever the element of corporate
profit is present, the function is usually classified as proprietary.5 In spite of the difficulty encountered by the courts in
1. Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924), 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039 (1927). Another maxim from which the doctrine
has gained force is that "the state is above the law." This concept has given rise
to the idea that governments must give their consent before they can be sued.
However, it does not apply to municipal corporations, which have never been immune from suit. See 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.01 (3d ed.
1950).
2. Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937).
3. Wysocki v. City of'Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 98 A.2d 659 (1953) ; Woodford
v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955) ; Heitman v. Lake City, 225
Minn. 117, 39 N.W.2d 18 (1947) ; Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23
S.E.2d 42 (1942) ; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357
(1945) ; Vaughn v. City of Alcoa, 194 Tenn. 449, 251 S.W.2d 304 (1952) ; Lakoduk v. Cruger, 287 P.2d 338 (Wash. 1955).
4. In Note, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 85, 88 (1932), the tests most often used are
enumerated: "The municipality acts in a governmental capacity.
"I. When it performs a duty imposed by the legislature of the state.
"II. Only when such imposed duty is one the state may perform and which
pertains to the administration of government.
. "Iii. When the municipality acts for the public benefit generally, as distinguished from acting for its immediate benefit and its private good.
"IV. When the act performed is legislative or discretionary as distinguished
from ministerial."
5. Libby v. City of Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 At. 805 (1909) ; Foss v. City
of Lansing, 237 Mich. 633, 212 N.W. 952 (1927).
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applying the fiction6 and the unanimous condemnation by text
writers, 7 the dichotomy is well established in most of the states.8
The instant case is a typical example of the law as it exists
in the nation today. The Minnesota court recognized the injustice of the decision, but felt that it was too securely bound
by precedent to make any change in the law. The fact was mentioned that a small admission charge was made for the use of

the pool, but the court pointed out that it was merely incidental
to the operation expense and that actually the municipality
maintained the pool at a substantial loss. It was also noted that
no charge was made to the deceased due to the fact that he was
under a certain age limit. It is doubtful that by this observation the court meant to imply that a person who had not paid
would be refused recovery, whereas one who had paid the admission fee could recover. This would mean that the operation
of a swimming pool would be classified as governmental with
6. Compare Mocha v. City of Cedar Rapids, 204 Iowa 51, 214 N.W. 587 (1927)
(operation of a swimming pool is a governmental function) with Hoggard v. City
of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939) (operation of a swimming pool is
a corporate function) ; Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505
(1919) (operation of a public park is a governmental function) with Warden v.
City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 374 (1925) (maintenance of a public
park is a corporate function) ; Brock-Hall Dairy Co. v. New Haven, 122 Conn.
321, 189 Ati. 182 (1937) (liability denied for operation of a fire truck) with Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924) (liability recognized for negligence in the operation of a fire truck) ; Paine v. City of Rochester, 14 N.Y. Supp.
180 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (operation of a steam roller is a governmental function) with
Denver v. Peterson, 5 Colo. App. 41, 36 Pac. 1111 (1894) (operation of a steam
roller is a corporate function) ; Bateson v. Marshall County, 213 Iowa 718, 239
N.W. 803 (1931) (operation of a road grader is a governmental function) with
Panhandle v. Byrd, 77 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (operation of a road
grader is a corporate function).
7. Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16
ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937) ; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J.
1, 129, 229 (1924-25), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27) ; Fordham & Pegues,
Local Government Responsibility in 'Tort in Louisiana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720 (1941) ; Green, Freedom of Litigation III, Municipal Liability for Torts,
38 ILL. L. REV. 355 (1944) ; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REV.
41 (1949).
8. New York has refused to allow municipal immunity from tort liability where
the state government, by statute, waived its immunity. Bernadine v. New York,
294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
See N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 860, § 8. South
Carolina, realizing that too much confusion has resulted from the dual concept of
governmental functions, has declared that the distinction no longer exists. Irvine
v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911), but has ruled that municipalities would be immune from liability in all cases unless liability was expressly conferred by statute. At one time the Ohio Supreme Court abolished the
rule and declared that municipalities would be judged on the same basis as private
corporations, Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919),
but the decision was overruled and the immunity doctrine reinstated three years
later. Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
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respect to one set of persons and proprietary to another group,
thereby giving a dual characterization to the same operation.
The early Louisiana jurisprudence held cities liable for the
negligence of their employees.9 Subsequent adoption of the fiction that a municipality may operate in a dual capacity was

hence not a limitation on the immunity doctrine but an introduction of it.1°'In applying the fiction in Louisiana, the courts
have held a municipal corporation to be operating in its governmental capacity and not subject to liability in situations involving such acts as negligence of police officers" and firemen ;12 negligence in the maintenance of a public park and playground ;18 operation of a free garbage collection service ;14 operation of a swimming pool;15 operation of an elevator in a municipal court building;16 and the illegal enforcement of police
regulations. 17 On the other hand the function has been declared
to be proprietary and the municipality has been subject to

liability when operating a public utility such as electric systems,18 natural gas distribution systems, 19 and transportation

systems. 20 Whenever the element of profit has been introduced
9. Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La. Ann. 100 (1850); McGary v.
Lafayette, 12 Rob. 674 (La. 1846) ; Lambeth v. Mayor, 6 La. 731 (1834) ; Mayor
v. Peyroux, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 155 (La. 1827).
10. Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Louisiana, 3
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 720, 724 (1941). Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. Ann.
461 (1854) was the first case to mention the dual capacity of municipal functions
in Louisiana. In the decision, two of the five justices dissented and a third concurred in the result. Therefore, the case cannot be regarded as very authoritative.
Lewis v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 190 (1857), however, affirmed the views of
the Stewart case.
11. Joliff v. Shreveport, 144 La. 62, 80 So. 200 (1918) ; Lewis v. New Orleans,
12 La. Ann. 190 (1857).
12. Barber Laboratories v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525 (1955).
13. Loustalot v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 164 So. 183 (La.
App. 1935) ; Godfrey v. Shreveport, 6 La. App. 356 (1927).
14. Manguno v. New Orleans, 155 So. 41 (La. App. 1934).
15. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App.
1936) ; cf. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 156 So. 64 (La. App.
1934).
16. Hoqard v. New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925).
17. Roach v. Shreveport, 8 La. App. 339 (1928).
18. Oliphant v. Town of Lake Providence, 193 La. 675, 192 So. 95 (1939)
Elias v. Mayor and Board of Trustees of City of New Iberia, 137 La. 691, 69 So.
141 (1915) ; Borrell v. Cumberland Telegraph and Telephone Co., 133 La. 630,
63 So. 247 (1913) ; Bonnin v. Town of Crowley, 112 La. 1025, 36 So. 842 (1904) ;
Lawn v. City of Monroe, 8 La. App. 541 (1928) ; Hart v. Town of Lake Providence, 5 La. App. 294 (1927); Bannister v. City of Monroe, 4 La. App. 182
(1926).
19. Phillips v. City of Alexandria, 11 La. App. 228, 123 So. 510 (1929).
20. Solomon v. New Orleans, 156 La. 629, 101 So. 1 (1924); Davis v. New
Orleans Public Belt R.R., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1924) ; Johnson v. City of
Monroe, 164 So. 456 (La. App. 1935) ; Young, v. New Orleans, 14 La. App. 306,
129 So. 247 (1930) ; Mask v. City of Monroe, 9 La. App. 431, 121 So. 250 (1928).
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the function has usually been classified as proprietary. 21 Lou-

isiana follows the rule that there may be liability for negligence
in the maintanence of streets,22 but has deviated from the doctrine in holding that in the construction of a street a city is
engaged in a governmental activity and cannot be liable for
negligence. 23 The immunity defense is personal to the city 24 and
cannot be raised by the insurer in a direct suit against the insur25
ance company.
The injustice of the doctrine of immunity was not apparent
when cities were small and the disbursement of municipal funds
would have worked a hardship on the municipality. However,
with the expansion of municipal activity the injustice has become evident and dissatisfaction has increased. 26 It has been
argued that municipal officers would be unable to carry out
27
their duties efficiently if subjected to rigid standards of care,
but there is no reason why the same standard applied to private
individuals should not be applied to governmental employees.
Supporters of the doctrine of immunity claim that the municipality would be too vulnerable a target and could not stand the
burden of litigation; but, as one writer aptly said, to argue this
point would be to "burn the ship to get rid of the rats. ' 28 A re21. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121
(1935) (swimming pool to which a small admission charge was made was declared to be proprietary so as to subject the city to liability when it was not
alleged that the charge was merely incidental to the operational expense) ; Brooks
v. Bass, 184 So. 222 (La. App. 1938) (golf course operated for profit is a proprietary function).
22. Clinton v. City of.West Monroe, 187 So. 561 (La. App. 1939) ; Holbrook
v. City of 'Monroe, 157 So. 566 (La. App. 1954) ; Lemoine v. City of Alexandria,
151 La. 562, 92 So. 58 (1922) ; O'Neill v. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 220 (1878).
23. Prunty v. Shreveport, 61 So.2d 548 (La. App. 1952), affirmed, 223 La.
475, 66 So.2d 3 (1953).
24. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. 1936).
25. LA. R.S. 22:665 (1950).

26. "The distinction between what is a governmental and what is a ministerial function of a city is not always so clear that a given transaction may at
once be classified as the one or the other; but, whether governmental or not, it
is always quite difficult, if not impossible, to give a satisfactory reason for holding
a city immune from liability when through its own negligence or the carelessness
or inefficiency of its agents and employees it violates a right of a citizen to his
injury." Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 638, 94 So. 697, 699 (1922).
27. Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions
of Municipal Corporations,23 MIcH. L. REV. 325, 337 (1925) : "In the final analysis the immunity rests upon three grounds; first, the technical rule that the
sovereign is immune from suit; second, the ancient idea that it is better that an'
individual should suffer an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience; and third, that liability would tend to retard the agents of the city in
the performance of their duties for fear of suit being brought against the municipality."
28. Green, Freedom of Litigation III, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL.
L. REV. 355, 379 (1944).
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cent attempt was made to have the Louisiana Supreme Court
eliminate the immunity which it had created, but the court refused to alter its position. 29 Some municipalities have protected
their citizens by taking out liability insurance, thereby waiving

their immunity. 30 Such piecemeal action is effective within the
sphere in which it operates, but complete elimination of the

immunity doctrine can come only through legislative enactment. 81
John B. Hussey, Jr.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT -

ZONING -

EXCLUDING COMMERCIAL

ENTERPRISES FROM INDUSTRIAL AREAS

Plaintiff, intending to construct retail stores, purchased property located in an industrial zone of a municipality. After plaintiff had applied for a building permit, the zoning ordinance

was amended to restrict the use of property in the industrial
zone exclusively to "light industrial" uses which were not detrimental to health, safety, and property, and specifically to exclude residential and retail commercial uses. Plaintiff alleged
that the amendment was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,
and a deprivation of property without due process of law. The
trial court, sustaining the validity of the ordinance, issued a
summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, the New Jersey
29. Barber Laboratories, Inc. v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525
(1955). The plaintiffs pointed out in their brief that the Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315 was based on the French Code Civil article 1384 and cited the commentators: 14 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt TH.tORIQUE PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CivIL 1147, § 2917 (2d ed. 1905) ; 8 HuC, COMMENTAIRE THII0RIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DU CODE CIVIL 598 (1895) ; 20 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 440,
667 (2d ed. 1876), as saying that immunity of municipalities from tort liability
did not exist in France. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
Government, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 308, 316
1954-1955 Term -Local
(1956).
30. Among the larger cities in Louisiana, New Orleans and Baton Rouge carry
limited insurance, whereas Shreveport carries none (based on letters written by
the author to city attorneys). Cities which own their public utilities generally
carry liability insurance on them, for the operation of public utilities has been
classified as proprietary and the governmental immunity has not extended to
them. Of interest is section 6-303(2) of the Home Rule Charter of the City of
New Orleans: "The City may, without waiver of its governmental immunity, procure public liability, bodily injury, and property damage insurance covering such
risks and in such amounts as the Council may ordain, provided all such policies
of insurance shall contain a stipulation that the insurer shall not assert the governmental immunity of the City as a defense of any suit on such policies."
31. The federal government has paved the way in this direction with the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952). For suggested
state and local laws, see Borchard, Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing
Public Liability in Tort, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 282 (1942).

